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SPORTS TORTS IN WISCONSIN*
JAY A. URBAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of Americans engage in sporting events every year. Partici-
pation in sports by recreation-inclined individuals from youth to adult
constantly rises by the season. Young athletes are playing their hearts
out in countless organized events from soccer fields to hockey rinks.
Many adults enjoy the exercise and competition from tennis courts to
bike trails. Whatever the draw, recreational, amateur, and professional
athletes rush to sporting endeavors as weekend warriors or scholarship
winners as their love affair with various physical games runs hotter each
season. Hand-in-hand with sports come injuries-which are unfortu-
nately increasing with this sporting way of life. It is not a matter of
whether you will be hurt if you participate in sports, but rather where,
when, how, and why you will be hurt, given the physical nature of most
athletic events. And, once saddled with an injury, an athlete often faces
significant disability and pain due to the extension of personal physical
limits and competitiveness which many athletic contests require.
This article focuses on the field of Wisconsin's tort law which has
been shaped by lawsuits from individuals injured in certain aspects of
sporting life. The societal costs of these injuries are staggering. As dam-
ages including lost time from the workplace, medical bills, and lost en-
joyment of life mount, injured athletes may be able to stride, limp, or
wheel to the courthouse in growing numbers for compensation for these
injuries. If the injured party is a highly compensated professional athlete,
the economic damages may easily run into the seven figures. As athletes
become bigger, faster, stronger-and more determined to win at any
cost-the potential for injuries increases. If the percentage of Wisconsin
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appellate tort cases concerning recreational activities and the flurry of
recent legislation are any indication, a developing complex area of sports
tort law will evolve through the efforts of lawyers, judges, and legislators;
well into the next century.
However, since there are only a small percentage of athletes who can
and do choose to litigate (many individuals, like students, are reluctant
to litigate), this area of law will likely be developed based on very few
cases compared to other areas of civil law.
I. CAUSES OF AcTION
Typical cases for sports torts can be delineated into specific catego-
ries involving injured parties and potential tortfeasors. For the purposes
of this discussion, the focus will be on the particular issues and nuances
of individual sports tort actions. It is conceivable that an injury will be
produced by a combination of actions or inactions by individuals from a
combination of the areas discussed herein, so a prudent trial lawyer
should analyze the elements of each potential action.
When deciding whether to take on a sports injury case, obtaining the
rules of the game or any standards should be the first priority. Taking
photographs, researching a defendant's background, obtaining weather
records and injury reports, getting statements from witnesses, and apply-
ing statutes and case law to the facts comes next.' After a factual back-
ground has been developed, it is time to consider the type of action.
A. Athlete/Participant vs. Co-participant
This action involves an injury sustained by one participant at the
hands of another during an athletic contest. The prevailing judicial senti-
ment, nationwide, has allowed recovery for these types of sports injuries
under certain circumstances with the standard of care as the primary fo-
cus.2 The "gut" issue in these cases is whether proof that ordinary negli-
gence caused the injury is sufficient, or whether some degree of
intentional or reckless conduct should be a condition precedent for re-
covery.3 That is, what degree of conduct by one athlete will permit suit
1. John F. Romano, et al., Sports Injury and Recreational Tort Cases, TRIAL, June, 1990, at
32.
2. Mel Narol, Sports Participation With Limited Litigation: The Emerging Reckless Disre-
gard Standard, 1 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT L. 29 (1991); Ray Yasser, In The Heat Of Competi-
tion: Tort Liability Of One Participant To Another; Why Can't Participants Be Required To Be
Reasonable?, 5 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT L. 253 (1995).
3. Id.
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by a teammate or opponent while balancing the "societal" concerns of
vigorous competition and opening the floodgates of litigation.'
The prevailing legislation in Wisconsin for co-participants in team
contact sports now says recklessness is the standard, but the judicial
foundations speak to negligence. Wis. Stat. §895.525 provides in perti-
nent part as follows:
(4m) LIABILITY OF CONTACT SPORTS PARTICIPANTS. (a) A par-
ticipant in a recreational activity that includes physical contact be-
tween persons in a sport involving amateur teams, including teams
in recreational, municipal, high school and college leagues, may
be liable for an injury inflicted on another participant during and
as part of that sport in a tort action only if the participant who
caused the injury acted recklessly or with intent to cause injury. (b)
Unless the professional league establishes a clear policy xvith a
different standard, a participant in an athletic activity that in-
cludes physical contact between persons in a sport involving pro-
fessional teams in a professional league may be liable for an injury
inflicted on another participant during and as part of that sport in
a tort actions only if the participant who caused the injury acted
recklessly or with the intent to cause injury. (Emphasis added).
In essence, the legislature, in the 1995 session, established a reckless or
intentional standard of care for participant liability. However, in 1993
the Wisconsin Supreme Court bucked the national trend and adopted
negligence as its standard for participant injuries in recreational team
contact sports.5 In Lestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., a case involving a
co-participant in a recreational adult soccer game who injured another
player by "side tackling" him (which was against the league rules), the
Court adopted a factor intensive analysis of the team contact sport co-
participant negligence standard:
The very fact that an injury is sustained during the course of a
game in which the participants voluntarily engaged and in which
the likelihood of bodily contact and injury could reasonably be
foreseen materially affects the manner in which each player's con-
duct is to be evaluated under the negligence standard. To deter-
mine whether a player's conduct constitutes actionable negligence
(or contributory negligence), the fact finder should consider such
material factors as the sport involved; the rules and regulations
4. See Dean P. Laing, Liability of Contact Sports Participants, 66 Wis. LAW. 12 (SEPT.
1993).
5. Hana R. Miura, Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.: Widening The Court As A
Playing Field For Negligent Participants In Recreational Team Contact Sports, 1994 Wis. LAW
RIv. 1005.
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governing the sport; the generally accepted customs and practices
of the sport (including the types of contact and the level of vio-
lence generally accepted); the risks inherent in the game and
those that are outside the realm of anticipation; the presence of
protective equipment or uniforms; and the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case; including the ages and physical at-
tributes of the participants, the participants' respective skills at
the game, and the participants' knowledge of the rules and
customs.
6
Justice Abrahamson concluded that within the circumstances of a
sport, the negligence standard offers the consideration and flexibility
necessary to allow "vigorous competition" while allowing an avenue for
sports victim compensation.7 In the past, actions have been allowed to
proceed for negligence of a co-participant in a non-contact team sport.8
Throughout the various stages of Wis. Stat. §895.5259 and the Wis-
consin Supreme Court decision of Lestina,'0 lawmakers, justices/judges,
and attorneys in this state have wrestled with the standard of care issue
involving co-participants in team contact sports. The current statute is
really a "responsibility" law for indoor and outdoor recreational activi-
ties. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not yet considered how team
contact sport produced injuries will be treated by Wisconsin trial courts
in the future. According to an analysis by the Legislative Reference Bu-
reau, Wis. Stat. §895.525(4m) was intended to change the standard of
care to "recklessness" in reaction to the Lestina decision (see 1995 As-
sembly Bill 628). As yet, no appellate court has considered the change.
Further, the Lestina decision did not address the ramifications of the
previous statute (since the plaintiff's injury took place before the earlier
revision of this statute went into effect).
6. 176 Wis.2d 901, 913 (1993) (citing Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977)).
7. Id. at 913-14.
8. See, e.g., Cepina v. South Milwaukee School Board, 73 WVis.2d 338 (1976)(affirming the
denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in negligence action of co-participant in a
softball game where plaintiff was struck in the eye by a bat).
9. Wis. Stat. §895.525 became the law in 1988 and was amended twice by the legislature in
1995. See 1987 Act 377, §19, eff. May 3, 1988, which created the legislation. 1995 Act 223, §8
eff. May 1, 1996, amended the language to include actions for death. 1995 Act 447, §1, eff. July
9, 1996, created subsec. (4)(m). Subsection (4m) only applies to injuries occurring on or after
the effective date.
10. 176 Wis.2d 901 (1993). Justice Shirley Abrahamson, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that the rules of negligence, not recklessness or an intentional standard, govern liability
for injuries incurred during recreational team contact sports.
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If a potential client walks through the door having been injured after
July 9, 1996, (the effective date of Wis. Stat. §895.525(4m)) by a co-par-
ticipant in a team contact sport, a trial lawyer needs to immediately as-
certain answers to these questions: Did the injury happen during a team
sporting event? Was physical contact part of the sport? What rules apply
to the game? How did the accident occur? Where did the accident take
place? Is the plaintiff a participant or spectator? In addition to assessing
the myriad of other considerations for sports torts, the threshold issue in
sports torts by co-participants is whether the tortfeasor will be held to
the negligence or recklessness standard, and thus what elements and de-
gree of proof a jury will consider. The statute is extremely narrow, and
many sporting events will not qualify because they fall outside the two
basic requirements of team activity and physical contact (consider many
two-person competitions involving no consent for physical contact). By
default, the argument should be made that the ordinary negligence stan-
dard applies as set forth in Lestina for all cases where no "team" or
"contact" is present because the recreational activity statute apparently
would not govern the situation.
While assumption of risk has been abrogated in our jurisdiction," a
variation apparently exists within the recreational activity statute. Wis.
Stat. §895.525(3) establishes a category of "appreciation of risk" by stat-
ing: "A participant in a recreational activity engaged in on premises
owned or leased by a person who offers facilities to the general public
for participation in recreational activities accepts the risks inherent in
the recreational activity of which the ordinary prudent person is or
should be aware."
This is a statement of contributory negligence and not a bar to recov-
ery. However, it is very questionable whether comparative negligence
would apply for team contact sport participants at all, given the new
reckless standard, since a jury would be forced to compare negligent
conduct to reckless conduct.
In summary, a thorough evaluation of the Lestina factors and Wis.
Stat. §895.525, coupled with a complete understanding of the rules of the
sport, as well as the accident itself, provide the backdrop for case prose-
cution. As a final observation, even with the division of reckless versus
negligent conduct as a precursor to liability, given the natural assump-
tion of risk attitudes which people may have toward sports participants
11. See Polsky v. Levine, 73 Wis.2d 547 (1976) (conduct constituting an implied or tacit
assumption of risk is no longer a bar to an action for negligence, but constitutes contributory
negligence and is subject to the comparative negligence statute).
1998]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
and the latitude given competitive co-participants, the egregiousness of
the tortfeasor's conduct should almost be the litmus test in case selec-
tion. A comprehensive application of the rules of the game to the cir-
cumstances of injury is as important as any other analysis. Consulting a
sports expert at the informal discovery stage is also advisable.
B. Spectator/Athlete vs. Landowner or Sponsor
Ranging from sliced golf balls, to wayward pucks, to sloppy turf, po-
tential actions involve persons injured due to the negligence of the sport-
ing event host who may be required to provide warning and/or
reasonably safe facilities for the event. In general, a landowner is not
under a duty to protect the participant from a known or obviously dan-
gerous risk unless it is anticipated or foreseeable that a participant could
be injured.1 2
Wisconsin has enacted a recreational use statute, Wis. Stat. §895.52,
governing many cases. 3 Contrasted with Wis. Stat. §895.525, this statute
is an "immunity" law. Governmental bodies, persons, non-profit organi-
zations, tenants and/or municipalities are immune from liability for out-
door activities causing injury on the premises. 4 Immunity does not exist
and thus liability may attach for government-owned property where an
admission fee is charged, or there is a malicious act or failure to warn. 5
Non-profit organizations likewise are not liable as long as no malicious
act or failure to warn of an unsafe condition occurs.'6 Further, private
property owners are not immune from malicious acts, or if they derive
over $2,000 per year income from the recreational activities.' 7 Finally, a
landowner is not immune if sponsoring "any organized team sport
activity."' 8
12. WALTER B. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 108 (1983).
13. Wis. Stat. §29.62 commonly referred to as the "berry picking statute" was first enacted
in 1963. Similar to Wis. Stat. §895.52, which repealed this statute, the immunity afforded to
landowners has been for a relief from warning of potential dangerous conditions and keeping
the premises safe absent willful or wanton conduct and a fee charged. Wis. Stat. §895.52 was
enacted in 1983 (1983 Wis. Act 418) to provide limited liability for landowners who derive
minimal profit for a plethora of recreational activities both identified and similar in
circumstance.
14. Wis. Stat. §895.52 (1995-96).
15. Wis. Stat. §895.52(3).
16. Wis. Stat. §895.52(4)
17. Wis. Stat. §895.53(6). (Note: Wis. Stat. §895.52(3) does not provide a dollar minimum
for state or other government-owned property).
18. Wis. Stat. §895.52(1)(g).
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Wis. Stat. §895.52 has been arguably one of the most litigated pieces
of legislation in our appellate courts over the past several years. In gen-
eral, the provisions have been liberally construed in favor of landowner
immunity according to express legislative intent. However, there are a
variety of circumstances which flesh out the rules to be considered when
analyzing a potential action. Cases of note include the following which
attempt to define the statute's requirements19:
1. Degree of Care Required. Wilson v. Waukesha County2" defined "ma-
licious" actions as those arising out of hatred, ill will, a desire for revenge
or those inflicted under circumstances where insult or injury is
intended.2
2. Fees Generated. Nelson v. Schreiner" held that the fact that a county
campground generated fees of $18,000 annually should not negate liberal
construction of immunity.'
3. Application of Safe Place Statute. Douglas v. Dewey24 stated that if
immunity could be negated then the safe place statute may apply to rec-
reational premises.
4. Constitutionality. Kruschke v. City of New Richmond' addressed the
constitutionality under Wis. Const. Art. I §9 which entitles every person
to a certain remedy for all wrongs, and found that the statute did not
violate this provision. Szarzynski v. YMCA Camp Minikani 6 deter-
mined the statute was not unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
5. Nature of Immunity. Verdollak v. Mosinee Paper Corp.27 stood for
two propositions-(a) immunity applies regardless of landowner's per-
mission, and (b) both non-recreational and recreational purposes fall
within the statute's purview.
19. See generally Alexander T. Pendelton, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute, 66 Wis.
LAW. 14 (MAY, 1993).
20. 157 Wis.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1990).
21. See also Moua v. Northern States Power Co., 157 Wis.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1990); Ervin v.
City of Kenosha, 159 Wis.2d 464 (1991); Wis. J.I.-Civil §1707.
22. 161 Wis.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1991).
23. See also Moua, 157 Wis.2d at 186 (which held that the economic benefit must come
from the recreational activity and not other business activities of the owner unrelated to
recreation).
24. 154 Wis.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1990).
25. 157 Wis.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1990).
26. 184 Wis.2d 875 (1994).
27. 200 Wis.2d 624 (1996).
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6. Nature of Activity. Linville v. City of Janesvilles focused on the na-
ture and purpose of the activity in determining whether it was
recreational. 9
7. Spectator or Participant. Kostronski v. County of Marathon ° found
that attendance at a picnic as a spectator of a ball game qualified as a
recreational activity for the purposes of the statute.
The best arguments for plaintiffs seeking compensation and avoid-
ance of the recreational use statute's immunity include: (1) discovering
that the activity occurred indoors and/or as part of a sponsored team
event; (2) finding that the landowner profited from the recreational ac-
tivity; and (3) establishing that the precise activity causing injury was
non-recreational in nature (for example, by proving that the injury oc-
curred while in transit to or from a sports event). However, the courts
have been reluctant to strike down the statute given the pro-landowner
legislative purpose (no doubt due in part to Wisconsin's commitment to
outdoor recreation and tourism).
C. Athlete/Student vs. School
Usually the school itself is the primary party in a sports injury lawsuit
due to the employer/employee relationship of its coaches, teachers, su-
pervisors, or athletic directors, and the ownership of its facilities. This is
often the party with insurance coverage, hopefully providing relief for
the injury claims. If student-athletes are injured while participating in
school sponsored athletic programs, the school district should be consid-
ered as a defendant since it owes a general duty of care to protect these
students from reasonably foreseeable and preventable harms. Some ju-
risdictions have found a duty of supervision for various sporting events
and practices. Age and maturity of the student-athlete are important fac-
tors to consider, and contributory negligence defenses need to be as-
sessed. There may be a waiver or release of liability issues present. But
overall, the conduct of the school as supervisor and the student as par-
ticipant, should be closely examined and compared. Further, discovery
should obtain the personnel files of any school employees alleged to be
negligent in their duties in addition to typical investigatory measures.
28. 184 Wis.2d 705 (1994).
29. See also Fischer v. Doylestown Fire Dept, 199 Wis.2d 83 (Ct. App. 1995); Sievert v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis.2d 413 (1995).
30. 158 Wis.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1990).
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In Wisconsin, recent appellate decisions regarding school liability for
sports injuries have dealt with governmental immunity. Since many
schools are owned/operated by governmental entities, whether a defend-
ant's conduct in discharging a duty of care is ministerial or discretionary,
impacts the nature of the case. As an additional cautionary note regard-
ing governmental entities, attorneys should prepare to meet the strong-
est notice of claim requirements of Wis. Stat. §§893.80 and/or 893.82.
D. Athlete vs. Coach/Teacher
This cause of action is often part of the claim against the school or
sponsor. Claims involve negligent supervision, failure to properly train
for the sport, inadequate rule instruction, or other common tort claims
(e.g., assault). In addition, there may be claims for "forcing" an athlete
to compete despite a physical condition or condition of the facility. On
the end of the spectrum, coaches may also be sued for defamation and
tortious interference with contract in certain circumstances.3 '
The focus is usually on the degree of foreseeability of harm and the
duty owed by the coach/supervisor to the athlete. Due to the degree of
control and responsibilities of a coach, these actions have been quite suc-
cessful in past litigation.32 In short, a coach has the legal responsibility to
minimize the risk of injury to athletes under his or her control.33 More-
over, coaches' responsibilities encompass a wide range of supervisory
and judgment areas from player traveling, to team physician diagnoses.
Due to the broad level of supervision, an investigation into potentially
negligent actions or inactions is a threshold necessity in most injury cases
involving team athletics. Perhaps another reason why coaches are found
liable is due to the wealth of information in sports literature at their
disposal regarding injury prevention. Obtaining this literature in a fo-
cused coaching negligence action is imperative.
E. Athlete or Spectator vs. Official/Referee
If a sports game official or referee fails to act or acts unlike a reason-
ably prudent official should, he or she may be held liable for injuries
sustained by a player during the course of an athletic contest. Specific
duties include; enforcing the rules of the sport, supervising the athletes,
and checking the integrity of the field or court surface. Careful officials
31. See e.g., Bauer v. Murphy, 191 Wis.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1995).
32. See Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal Liability
of Coaches for A Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HAiLL J. SPORT L. 7 (1996).
33. Id. at 15.
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should inspect playing topography for hazards before play as well as
weather conditions and game equipment. In particular, during play it is
important for referees to enforce disciplinary rules against problem ath-
letes, and to keep spectators in appropriate viewing areas. Finally, an
injured athlete should be attended to immediately by stopping play until
the athlete's safety may be guaranteed.
In Wisconsin, lawsuits have been brought against referees for some
time, as evidenced by a 1914 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision uphold-
ing a jury verdict exonerating a boxing referee from any negligence in
failing to stop a fight."4 Using a negligence standard of care, the circum-
stances of injury, and the rules of the game, an action against sports offi-
cials should be investigated and evaluated, if the circumstances of
injuries warrant.
F. Athlete vs. Product
Products used in competitive sports are subject to state products lia-
bility laws governing defective or unsafe equipment manufactured or
sold as sports equipment. Companion claims may also be brought
against the organizing institution which supplies and owns the equip-
ment.3 - Key evidence includes prior claims, known defects, state of the
art information, witness statements, photographs/film, modification, and
instruction factors. Attorneys should keep in mind the following focus
with experts to decide: (1) whether the product caused the injury; (2)
whether the product was proper for the ordinary needs of participants;
and (3) whether the product design was unsafe or defective.36
Potential cases can involve football and batting helmets, protective
masks, ski bindings, gymnastic equipment (i.e., trampolines), gym equip-
ment, and other recreational devices.37 In Wisconsin, a reported decision
in Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc.3 8 involved a baseball pitch-
ing machine which crushed the skull of the plaintiff. A jury found the
machine to be defective and unreasonably dangerous to the point of
awarding punitive damages. Certainly, a product-intensive study should
be made concerning an injured person's sporting equipment, especially
protective gear, for possible claims.
34. Paramentier v. McGinnis, 157 Wis. 596 (1914).
35. Lee R. Russ, Products Liability: Competitive Sports Equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 201,
210-11 (1990).
36. Id, at 212.
37. Id,
38. 97 Wis.2d 136 (1980).
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As an example, on a national scale, according to a 1991 Sports Illus-
trated article3 9 "lawsuits brought against helmet manufacturers have
forced them to make their products even safer." This article was in re-
sponse to the 1990 football season, the first in which no one died from a
football-related injury. Presumably, trial lawyers helped to make those
products safer for participants.
G. Athlete vs. Medical Provider
While the term "team physician" may imply a conflict of loyalty, gen-
erally a sports medicine practitioner seeks to treat and prevent sports
injuries. This duty to treat includes medically clearing athletes for partic-
ipation in athletics and rendering appropriate care after a sports injury
(i.e. MRI's, CT scans, x-ray's, etc.). Although there are few reported
cases involving athletic medical malpractice litigation, injured parties
may make these claims under the circumstances of sport, which would
include fraud and misrepresentation of condition. Physicians can rely on
appreciation of risk or contributory negligence defenses in addition to
the standard medical malpractice defenses.4" This is due to the fact that
many competitive athletes will choose to play hurt-just pick up any
sports page. Certainly, injured athletes have the right to play hurt against
medical advice. With the growth of sports medicine practice concurrent
with athletics, the medical literature on the topic may also afford specific
standards of care for sports injuries and medical/legal responsibilities.
Wisconsin statutory legislative exemptions have immunized volun-
teer team physicians for emergency care provided to athletes immedi-
ately before or after an injury.41 In order to qualify for immunity, a
physician cannot accept compensation or act within the scope of his or
her usual and customary practice in rendering emergency care to an ath-
lete.42 In addition, ski patrol members, nurses, chiropractors, dentists,
physician assistants, and emergency medical technicians will be afforded
civil liability immunity if the emergency health care is rendered at, or in
transportation to or from, an athletic event, and if no compensation for
services is contemplated.43 In general, the law of sports medicine and
39. Steve Wulf, The Safest Season; No one died from a football-related injury last year,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 29, 1991, at 16.
40. Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians and Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal Re-
sponsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 129, 132 (1993).
41. Wis. Stat. §895.48.
42. Wis. Stat. §895.48(1).
43. Wis. Stat. §§895.48 & 895.482.
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regulation of team trainers and physicians continues to develop.44 Courts
usually apply medical malpractice principles to tort actions brought by
athletes against physicians and trainers.45 Legal research of Wis. Stat.
§895.48 and related provisions contemporaneous with a factual and med-
ical record investigation should be completed early in the case
investigation.
In competitive sports, there is likely to be a contributory negligence
component to a sports medical malpractice claim. This involves an ath-
lete's decision to return to play after sustaining an injury. In fact, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") may provide the
athlete with the legal right to participate in a sport against a physician's
advice.46 The investigation then turns to the degree of information and
testing provided by the physician prior to the athlete making the choice
to return to play. Claims regarding a failure to diagnose, inappropriate
medical clearance, failure to disclose the extent of injury, and false infor-
mation may also weigh on an athlete's decision to compete.47
There are two final considerations worthy of discussion. First, sports
medicine itself is an area for which many physicians hold themselves out
as "specialists." Medical associations and related physician groups have
been developing certification requirements in the sports medicine area
in the 1990s, thus current standards must be researched on a case-by-
case basis.48 Obviously, this would be critical to a potential case investi-
gation. Second, there could be a situation where a team physician and a
coach together provided information which made the athlete decide to
play hurt. This scenario should be examined in light of the new joint and
several liability law.49
H. Combination Actions
As discussed earlier, these causes of action are not exclusive. Each
category may be combined into an action against more than one poten-
tial producer of injury, but each cause of action necessitates separate
44. See Matthew J. Mitten, Medical Malpractice Liability Of Sports Medicine Care Provid-
ers For Injury To, Or Death Of, Athlete, 33 A.L.R.5th 619 (1995).
45. Id. at 627.
46. Mitten, supra note 39, at 138.
47. Mitten, supra note 43, at 628.
48. Mitten, supra note 39, at 138-39.
49. See Wis. Stat. §895.045(2)(1995-96) which provides: "CONcERTED AcTnON. Notwith-
standing sub.(1), if 2 or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, those
parties are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from that action, except as
provided in s. 895.85(5)."
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legal requirements and strategies and a careful evaluation of potentially
diverse standards of care. Given the current joint and several liability
law in Wisconsin, great care in selecting and pursuing a "target" defend-
ant, while keeping in mind contributory negligence concerns, is
paramount.
III. COMMON DEFENSES
When deciding whether to accept a sports tort case, and eventually
considering a decision on litigation, several defense arguments and strat-
egies should be reviewed. The legislature and the courts have carved out
limitations on certain claims; juries may be influenced by other argu-
ments such as assumption of risk or knowingly confronting open and
obvious dangers in the sports setting. Certainly, in the vast majority of
cases, contributory negligence and other defenses will necessitate a thor-
ough review of the facts. Following are some of the defenses in sports
injury cases:
A. Governmental/Charitable Immunity
In the recent case of Kimps v. Hill,50 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
considered the acts of a teacher and the duty to provide safe equipment
for student-athletes in a volleyball game. While the court did not disturb
the finding of negligence against the teacher, it determined that the
teacher's actions were discretionary rather than ministerial (that is, "ab-
solute, certain and imperative") in nature, thereby providing immunity.-5
Depending on the governmental sponsorship nature of the athletic con-
test, especially where state and local public schools are involved, antici-
pating and analyzing the sovereign immunity defense under the
ministerial and discretionary case definitions is a must. In the even more
recent case of Bauder v. Delavan-Darien School District,2 the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a case when presented with a claim
from a student who suffered eye injuries when struck by a deflated soc-
cer ball kicked indoors. In short, recently Wisconsin courts have been
reluctant to find exception to the government immunity, afforded to
school employees, in finding the teacher's actions or inactions in Kimps
and Bauder to be "discretionary" rather than "ministerial."
50. 187 Wis.2d 508 (1994).
51. See J. Michael Riley, Discretionary Immunity: The Exception That Swallowed the Rule,
TFm VERDicr, at 10 (Summer 1996).
52. 207 Wis.2d 312 (1996).
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Further, under Wisconsin's recreational use statute, a specific defense
bar for all claims is afforded to charitable hosts of sporting events. As
discussed earlier, a charitable landowner/host will not be liable if the
qualifications of Wis. Stat. §895.52 are met. Given the hostile environ-
ment for these claims, attorneys should anticipate such defenses when-
ever and wherever the possibility exists.
B. Statutory Exemptions
As previously discussed, there are several legislative enactments cre-
ating recreational immunity for charitable organizations, governmental
employees, and health care professionals. Expect these defenses early in
litigation. In addition, the Wisconsin legislature recently passed a civil
liability exemption for "equine activities." 53 Under the horse-related
civil liability exemption statute, injured participants cannot sue sponsors
or professionals for the "inherent risks" of equestrian events excluding
faulty equipment, warning signs, and safe ability actions-or wilful, wan-
ton, or intentional actions. Spectators are not precluded from bringing
suit. Given the legislative trend, it is a good practice to search for any
future enactments which attempt to give tortfeasors exemptions from li-
ability. Challenges to these statutes should also be considered, but the
better strategy is to find a case specific way to remove the facts from
within the reach of the statute.
C. No Duty of Care/Public Policy
Due to the multitude of factors involved in producing many sports
injuries, and due to the corollary that multiple defendants may be named
in a suit, a typical defense may be that a particular defendant did not
have a duty toward the injured party. In Cirillo v. City of Milwaukee,54
the court found that a teacher of a gym class had a duty to supervise
students, and this duty should be measured by reasonable care. While in
athletic cases there may be intervening or superseding cause issues, the
duties of each responsible party need to be assessed to defeat common
defenses. In certain other recreational instances, the defense may allege
that the defendant did not owe the participant, official, or spectator a
duty of care. As the supreme court stated in A.E. Investment Corp. v.
Link Builders, Inc.,55 "[T]he duty of any person is the obligation of due
care to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm to others
53. Wis. Stat. §895.481 (1995-96).
54. 34 Wis.2d 705 (1967).
55. 62 Wis.2d 479, 483-84 (1974).
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even though the nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed per-
son or harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act." In applying
this duty concept, recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court used public
policy grounds to decline holding an adult responsible (in spite of a
jury's supportable finding of negligence) for failing to snuff out a camp-
site fire before bed, and thus denied recovery for a child who was
burned.5 6 The court found that the recreational use statute does not cre-
ate a higher duty than common law. 7
In a recreational or sporting event setting, some courts may be reluc-
tant initially when it comes to duty and standard of care issues. There-
fore, a resourceful attorney should carve duty arguments out of the
standards, rules, and accepted practices of a sport, and then apply this
logic to a traditional negligence, recklessness, or intentional analysis.
D. Contributory Negligence-"Open and Obvious Danger" and
"Assumption of Risk" Revisited
Even though the common law immunity of the concept of open and
obvious danger has been abrogated in Wisconsin,58 the argument is often
made when it comes to sports torts premises liability cases, especially in
higher risk or contact sports such as skiing or football. Likewise, the con-
cept of assumption of risk has been quashed in this state.59 However, it
has resurfaced in the "inherent risk" language in some of the recrea-
tional statutes. The statutes do refer to the comparative negligence stat-
ute, but where wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct is involved, do these
defenses really apply? Does a participant in a sport assume the risks of a
co-participant competing outside of the rules? There are numerous fac-
tors and considerations to evaluate. As always, the case facts will control
thereby allowing attorneys to make distinguishing arguments.
Recently, the court of appeals decided Moulas v. PBC Productions
Inc.60 involving a plaintiff who was a spectator at a Milwaukee Admirals
hockey game when she was struck by a puck flying over a plexiglas
screen. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants
and the court of appeals affirmed. The appellate court's opinion held
that two grounds supported dismissal of the action: (1) the evidence
56. Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis.2d 409 (1995).
57. Id.
58. See Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis.2d 836 (1975).
59. See Lestina, 176 Wis.2d at 901.
60. 213 Wis.2d 406 (Ct. App. 1997). (NOTE: Judge Fine dissented from the majority. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff-appellant's petition for review and scheduled
oral arguments on April 7, 1998.)
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failed to create a genuine issue of material fact (essentially because the
plaintiff's did not produce a liability expert on the standard of care); and
(2) the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law was at least
one percent more than any of the defendants. The appellate court con-
sidered "assumption of risk" as an element in considering a spectator's
contributory negligence rather than leaving this matter for a jury.6 ' The
court also relied on the so-called "baseball rule" espoused in Powless v.
Milwaukee County62 wherein a spectator at a baseball game was pre-
cluded from making an injury claim from a flying baseball. However,
the Powless case on its face is accurately distinguished from Moulas be-
cause of the plaintiff making an effort to sit behind a safety screen as
observed by Judge Fine in his dissent.63 By "plucking" this case from a
jury that could assess the facts, testimony, and inferences from those
facts, based not just on affidavits, including the eighty-seven prior similar
incidents, and the photographs showing higher plexiglas screens at other
ice rinks, the court of appeals demonstrated a willingness to apply negli-
gence as a matter of law to a plaintiff who, according to her police officer
brother eyewitness, bought tickets close to the rink behind the screen for
greater protection.
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court debates the Moulas case fur-
ther, the real concerns for counsel are whether sports torts plaintiffs are
treated the same as other plaintiffs by the courts and what proof is neces-
sary to defeat such a popular defense threatening many potential claims.
E. Liability Release/Waiver
Wisconsin cases have acknowledged that an exculpatory contract, ex-
empting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or reck-
lessly, is void as against public policy.64 Wisconsin appellate courts have
also determined that some waivers and liability releases can be enforcea-
ble in the potential negligence action.65 Further, Wisconsin decisions
have found that some exculpatory contracts are not consistent with pub-
lic policy regarding spectators when there is a mere awareness of danger
without a full contemplation of risk, before the form is signed.66 The
facts surrounding the negotiation and signing of the document control,
and the focus is on the knowledge, understanding, and experience of the
61. Id. at 419.
62. 6 Wis.2d 78 (1959).
63. 213 Wis.2d at 423.
64. Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis.2d 205 (1982).
65. See Kellar v. Lloyd, 180 Wis.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1993).
66. Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, Inc., 187 Wis.2d 596 (Ct. App. 1994).
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injured party before the release was signed.67 The courts must consider
each situation under the facts, keeping with public policy, that does not
favor upholding such contracts. The prescribed "balancing test" is be-
tween the individual's freedom to contract, and the principle that indi-
viduals should be compensated for injuries sustained as a reasonable
result of another's negligence.68 However, exculpatory contracts as a
rule are not favored by the law.69
In the ambit of sports, these types of contracts, and releases are as
prevalent and common as recreational activities. A full analysis of the
knowledge of the parties, the conditions of the release, the ambiguity or
uncertainty of any terms (the broadness and generalness), and the risks
contemplated are all factors which will affect the validity of the contract.
In a most recent case involving a recreational release, Yauger v. Skiing
Enterprises, Inc.,7" the Wisconsin Supreme Court evaluated a skiing lia-
bility waiver and held (after reviewing the recent Wisconsin law and ex-
culpatory contracts):
Among the principles that emerged from these cases, two are rel-
evant to our determination in this case. First, the waiver must
clearly, unambiguously and unmistakably inform the signer of
what is being waived. Second, the form, looked at in its entirety,
must alert the signer to the nature and significance of what is be-
ing signed. The waiver in question fails in both respects. Thus, the
Court finds this waiver void as against public policy under either
of these principles.7'
It is clear that the courts do not uphold exculpatory contracts with am-
biguous terms or with any deficiencies in the communication of the na-
ture and significance of the document being signed.
F. Statute of Limitations
Attorneys need to be particularly cognizant of time bars to sports
torts claims since different conduct standards may be at issue and thus
impact time calculations. For example, intentional torts have a two year
statute of limitations, and a jury may determine that what appeared to
be reckless conduct, was intentional.72 Early case selection and investiga-
67. See Trainor v. Aztalan Cycle Club, Inc., 147 Wis.2d 107, 111 (Ct. App. 1988).
68. See Merten, 108 Wis.2d at 212.
69. Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis.2d 502, 514 (1991).
70. 206 Wis.2d 76 (1996).
71. Id. at 84.
72. See Wis. Stat. §893.53.
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tion is necessary, and if borderline conduct is involved, then suit should
be initiated early rather than too late.
IV. HOT ISSUES
A. Discovery of Rules of Game/Facts
Because sports injuries occur on a playing field, the rules of the game
should control. One of the Lestina negligence factors specifically refers
potential litigants to the rules of the particular sport in order to deter-
mine whether an infraction occurred outside of the parameters of play. It
is an excellent practice to obtain any handbook, league rules, code of
conduct, or other sport requisites for analysis by an expert liability wit-
ness. Statements should be obtained from spectators, supervisors, and/or
participants. Photographs or videotape should be taken of the accident
scene depicting a specific defect or condition. Associations within a
sporting discipline may need to be contacted for potential information.
Since the law is in a state of flux on many issues, thorough research will
provide insight toward recovery.
B. Jury Instructions
Wis. J.I.-Civil §2020 is the new jury instruction for co-participant lia-
bility in recreational sporting events, including team contact sports. The
standard embodies the new Wis. Stat. §895.525 language as well as the
Lestina case factors. Since gross negligence is no longer a standard in
Wisconsin, the recklessness instruction required a definition which came
from Justice Wilcox's dissent in Lestina (see also RESTATEMENT 2D OF
TORTS §500). Negligence, safe-place, products liability, medical malprac-
tice, and/or duty of supervision instructions, if modified, may suffice for
other causes of action without a specific instruction. Using an advocate's
imagination, the official sport's rules, and the developing case law, indi-
vidualized jury instructions may need to be crafted for a particular fact
scenario. If the circumstances fit the case, an instruction referring to a
rule of the game, as a "safety standard," would be appropriate, followed
by incorporation of those rules into an instruction to reflect a particular
case pattern.
C. Insurance Coverage
While many schools, coaches, referees, doctors, landowners, busi-
nesses, and participants may have various forms of liability insurance,
providing potential coverage for the elements of sports torts, a lawyer
cannot be too careful and complete in obtaining and analyzing all poli-
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cies. Intentional conduct may be excluded by homeowners or liability
umbrellas, and the language may lead to an argument by defense counsel
that recklessness is also excluded. Subrogation language should also be
scrutinized for a failure to provide for the recovery of payments made
due to another party's recklessness. Some liability insurance policies
contain provisions excluding coverage for injury to a person while play-
ing an athletic event sponsored by a named insured.73
Because in Wisconsin, ambiguities in insurance contracts are gener-
ally construed against the insurer, a factual case analysis, keeping in
mind the exclusionary language, may disclose a way around such bars to
recovery. Wisconsin has some appellate law on both sides of this issue. In
Scott v. Min-Aqua Bats Water Ski Club,74 the court found that a water
skier's injuries were covered under the policy language since the acci-
dent occurred while the skier was not "preparing" or "actually partici-
pating" as defined as exclusions for the sporting event. In Ruppa v.
American States Ins. Co.,7' the court held that a horseback rider's inju-
ries and death were excluded under the policy because "cutting" was an
excluded-sporting event in a horse show contest.
Given the policy language intensive analysis, it is imperative to dis-
sect the exclusion after the facts are established and the sporting stan-
dards are defined. Sports and insurance language experts may also prove
helpful for defeating summary judgment.
D. Joint & Several Liability
The recent joint and several liability law is potentially vexing to many
sports torts cases. Given the multitude of factors which may apply to
sports injury claims, including contributory negligence and multiple
tortfeasors, a complete case analysis in light of Wis. Stat. §895.045 is
mandatory. For example, if a claim for reckless conduct is supported
against a co-participant, then joint and several liability and contributory
negligence may not apply. The statute requires on its face that compari-
sons only apply to "negligent" parties. However, if a negligence claim is
maintained, pleadings and arguments should take into account the
number of tortfeasors and their respective roles in causing the injury.
73. Tracy A. Bateman, Construction and Application of Provision in Liability Insurance
Policy Excluding Coverage for Injuries Sustained During Athletic or Sports Contest or Exhibi-
tion, 35 A.L.R.5th 731, 739 (1996).
74. 79 Wis.2d 316 (1977).
75. 91 Wis.2d 628 (1979).
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Also, there is the potential for making a "concerted action" claim against
multiple co-participants. This theory may also be used in other scenarios.
E. Comparing Negligent & Reckless Conduct
As mentioned earlier, the recent Wis. Stat. §895.525 responsibility
standard for team contact sports participants is fraught with an inherent
conflict because it requires "recklessness" to pursue a tortfeasor, but
only requires an "appreciation of risk" and several other factors (all of
which are ordinary care concerns under the comparative negligence stat-
ute, Wis. Stat. §895.045) from the plaintiff. In deciding the negligence of
the injured party, it is uncertain how a factfinder would "compare" this
to the reckless conduct required of a co-participant. It is this author's
opinion that if recklessness of a co-participant is proven, then contribu-
tory negligence, if any, is not a limit to recovery.
F. The American with Disabilities Act (ADA)
According to the ADA, which was signed into law in 1990, interscho-
lastic athletes can force reasonable accommodations for an athlete's dis-
abilities. 76 Not only may certain individuals now be permitted to
participate in athletic events, but spectators, coaches, referees and the
like must be afforded the protections outlined in the ADA from anti-
discriminatory facilities, seating, and programs. The ADA should be re-
viewed and analyzed for potential claims on a per case basis.
G. Constitutional Challenges
Lately, several groups of potential tortfeasors have been granted leg-
islative liability exemption or immunity by statute. These statutes may be
constitutionally challenged on equal protection or other grounds. How-
ever, the recreational use statute was found valid when constitutional
substantive due process, equal protection, 77 and right to access to the
courts, and to obtain justice under the law78 challenges were brought.
Constitutional challenges should at least be considered given the breadth
of the new laws.
76. 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. (1990).
77. See Szarzynski, 184 Wis.2d 875 (1994).
78. Kruschke, 157 Wis.2d 167 (1990).
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H. Punitive Damages
In the participant in team contact sports setting, and in any other
recreational activity where injury may occur, the constant focus has been
on the standard of care owed to others. Given the recklessness burden
for some co-participants and the nature of certain game rule infractions,
it is a good practice to evaluate, and perhaps pursue a punitive damage
claim under the right fact scenario. In a professional athletic setting, this
claim may not only have merit, but substantial economic power.
L Offers of Settlement
Cue v. Carthage College79 deals with the problems with statutory of-
fers of settlement directed to multiple defendants by the plaintiff football
player in an action against his college, coaches, trainer, and their insurer.
The plaintiff directed separate Wis. Stat. §807.01 offers to the insureds
and to the insurance company. The verdict exceeded each of the individ-
ual offer amounts, but not the aggregate. The appellate court refused to
uphold the offers because they did not state with clarity the sum it would
take to settle the case, and the confusion regarding the two offers
"doomed" the plaintiffs claim. In making offers of settlement for sports
claims with multiple defendants, an insurer and its insureds may be
grouped together on one offer as to those claims.8 0 Great care and re-
search as to the exact amount of settlement for each defendant on each
claim should also take place in the event that there are multiple claims
against multiple parties which may necessitate separate offers.Si
J. Psychological Studies
Emotional distress law in Wisconsin has been evolving throughout
the last half of this century. Mental damages have long been a part of the
damages recovery scheme in this state. Competitive athletes have unique
psychological make-ups. When facing a career-altering injury, an ath-
lete's psyche may be affected differently than others. Several renowned
university scholars have studied the mental components of athletics and
injuries, and this information may prove valuable in forwarding all
claims on behalf of injured athletes.
79. 179 Wis.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1993).
80. See Testa v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 164 Wis.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1991).
81. See generally David M. Skoglind, Making the "Right" Offer Under 80zo1, Stats., Tim
VERDicr, p. 12 (Fall 1991).
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V. CONCLUSION
Sports tort law is a small but developing and challenging field which
is changing through legislative and judicial definition in Wisconsin. Some
areas of legislation and causes of action will gain further interpretation
by the appellate courts as the judiciary dives into these cases and estab-
lishes the frontier of personal injury law involved in bringing sports torts
to the courts.
